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Zealots are the vertices in a social network who do not change their opinions under social pressure,
and are crucial to the study of opinion dynamics on complex networks. In this paper, we study
the effect of zealots on the polarization dynamics of a deterministic majority-rule model using the
configuration model as a substrate. To this end, we propose a novel quantifier, called ‘correlated
polarization’, for measuring the amount of polarization in the network when vertices can exists in
two opposite states. The quantifier takes into account not only the fraction of vertices with each
opinion, but also how they are connected to each other. We then show that the presence of zealots
does not have a fixed effect on the polarization, and can change it in positive, negative or neutral
way depending upon their topological characteristics like degree, their total fraction in the network,
density and degree heterogeneity of the network, and the type of initial conditions of the dynamics.
Our results particularly highlight the importance of the role played by the initial conditions in
drifting the polarization towards lower or higher values as the total number of zealots is increased.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social polarization is being studied at an increasing
rate by researchers from various fields in recent years
[3, 9, 16, 26]. This is partly due to the availability of
technological tools that make possible gathering and an-
alyzing data about social systems on an unprecedented
scale [6, 18]. At the same time, it is also becoming clear
that the same tools are causing increase in the polariza-
tion [11, 27, 29]. Polarization in social systems can lead
to a number of undesirable effects on democratic institu-
tions, and can lead to a biased decision making. More-
over, in a polarized society, false information can prop-
agate relatively easily, which in turn leads to increase
in the intolerance to opposing views and segregation of
ideologies. Thus, it has become an indispensable neces-
sity to gain a proper understanding of its emergence and
stability.
In this paper, we study an effect of zealotry on the
emergence of polarization in social networks. Zealots
are the vertices in a social network who never change
their opinion, and are considered highly influential in
the opinion dynamics on complex networks [8, 14, 15,
19, 20, 28, 31]. To support this hypothesis, past stud-
ies about zealotry have used models with random initial
conditions (RICs) where every person in the network has
some non-neutral opinion initially, and it is independent
of the opinions of its neighbours [20, 28, 32]. In con-
trast, many disputes in real-social networks originate on
a small subset of vertices (called seeds), and then spread.
Such ‘seed initial conditions’ or SICs have recently been
shown to lead to considerably different results [25]. This
is probably because they effectively lead to initial condi-
tions with correlated vertex states. Hence it is important
to study the effect of zealots with both RICs and SICs
in opinion dynamics on networks. Here we note that the
idea of propagation starting from different seeds has been
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considered in other situations also [10, 21].
There is another aspect to zealotry which, as per our
knowledge, has not been given enough attention in the lit-
erature: the topology based zealotry. Studies on zealotry
in complex networks usually assume that the probability
for a vertex to be a zealot is independent of its network
characteristics like its degree or its local clustering. As we
show in the following pages, the topology based zealotry
can lead to different outcomes than the case where zealots
are randomly chosen. Thus, in this paper we have two
types of initial conditions (RICs vs SICs) and two types
of zealotries (Uniform vs Topology based), or four com-
binations in total. We study polarization dynamics using
a simple majority-rule model for each of these four cases,
and find that differing results are produced.
One of the novel aspects of our work is a new method
for the quantification of the network polarization when
the vertex states are known. The polarization related
studies so far have relied on the fractions of vertices with
different opinions to quantify it. However, this misses an
important information about how they are connected to
each other. Our quantification takes into account both:
the fractions, as well as the way vertices with different
opinions are connected to each other. We argue that this
leads to a quantification of polarization that is consistent
with our intuitive notions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec.
II, we briefly review a simple majority rule model intro-
duced in [25], to be used in the rest of the paper. In Sec.
II A, we discuss the idea of quantifying polarization in
networks based on the fractions of opposite opinions and
their inter-connectivity. The effect of zealots is studied in
Sec. III with respect to RICs and SICs using the Erdo˝s-
Ren´yi graph as well as the configuration model with a
power-law degree distribution. In the same section we
also look at the polarization dynamics on three empirical
networks, and interpret the obtained results. Finally, a
degree based zealotry is introduced and studied in Sec.
IV. We conclude in Sec. V with a discussion.
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2II. THE MODEL
Consider an undirected network with N vertices and
m edges. In our model, every vertex could be in three
different states: +1,−1 or 0, where +1 and −1 represent
the opposite opinions while the 0 corresponds to the neu-
tral point of view. At each discrete time step, the state
of each vertex i is updated according to the following
majority rule:
xi(t+ 1) = sgn
xi(t) +∑
j
Aijxj(t)
 (1)
Here xi(t) represents the state of vertex i at time t,
and Aij is the (i, j)
th element of the adjacency matrix.
Also, sgn(x) is the sign function which takes the value +1
if x > 0, the value −1 if x < 0 and the value 0 otherwise.
The states of all the vertices are updated simultaneously,
and hence the synchronous update is used.
In our model, each vertex i in the network could be a
zealot with a probability pz, which means that if it has a
concrete opinion (i.e if xi ∈ {−1,+1}), then it will never
change its state whatever the states of its neighbours.
Note that, this means that a zealot is allowed to change
its state if the state is 0. We study this model for two
different types of initial conditions: ‘random initial con-
ditions’ (RICs), in which every vertex is initially in one
of the two states {−1, 1} uniformly randomly, and the
‘seed initial conditions’ (SICs) in which all vertices are
in 0 state except two vertices which have exactly opposite
states. The way zealots affect the polarization is funda-
mentally different in the two cases. In case of SICs, even
if a vertex is a zealot, it must acquire certain non-neutral
opinion (+1 or −1) before it could start influencing its
neighbours without letting its own state change. This is
not true for RICs because each vertex has some opinion
to start with, and hence zealots stop getting influenced
from their neighbours from the start of the dynamics.
We find that almost in all cases, the network quickly
stabilizes with the state of each vertex becoming con-
stant in time. Depending on the initial conditions and
other parameter values, this equilibrium state could be
homogeneous (all the vertices in the same state) or het-
erogeneous.
A. What constitutes a polarization?
We want to quantify the asymptotic equilibrium states
of a network with respect to the amount of polarization.
One way to do this is to measure the fraction of ver-
tices with each state. We define the following quantity
to measure this:
R = 1− 2|n− − 0.5| (2)
Here, n− represents the fraction of vertices with state −1,
and R ∈ [0, 1]. It can be easily verified that this definition
assigns R = 0 to the homogeneous states, whereas the
states with roughly equal numbers of +1 and −1 vertices
are considered highly polarized, and are assigned values
close to 1. A large number of studies related to binary
opinion dynamics use similar quantifiers for polarization
based only on the fraction of vertices in each group [4, 5,
13, 20].
However, there exists another aspect to social polar-
ization which is not captured by R: social polarization is
often seen to lead to a fragmentation of the society [5].
In other words, in a polarized social network, vertices
with similar opinions are usually observed to be preferen-
tially connected to each other. Hence, it is important to
take into account this information if we want to properly
characterize the amount of polarization. The previous
measures have mostly looked at the fractions of vertices
with each of the opinions, and hence lack the information
about the fragmentation. We can measure this tendency
using the assortativity coefficient r of the network with
respect to the vertex states [23, 24]. If the connected ver-
tices tend to have similar opinions, r has a positive value,
whereas if the opposite is true, r has a negative value. If
no such tendency exists, r is close to 0. It makes sense
then to quantify the polarization using both R and r to-
gether. We point out that the aim here is to quantify the
polarization of a network as opposed to the polarization
of a particular topic. The latter problem has received a
great deal of attention in recent years [4, 10, 21]. Fig. 1
shows four network states for the Zachary karate network
[33]:
1. Small R, small r: A state dominated by only one
type (+1 or −1), and the similar vertices are not
preferentially connected. We would intuitively la-
bel this state as a low polarization state.
2. Small R, large r: A state dominated by only one
type, but the similar vertices are preferentially con-
nected to each other forming a “fringe” group. Here
we would say that this state has moderate polar-
ization.
3. Large R, small r: Roughly equal numbers of two
vertex types exist, but since similar vertices don’t
preferentially connect to each other, no big extreme
groups are formed. Thus, we would label this as a
state with moderate polarization.
4. Large R, large r: A state with roughly equal num-
bers of the two types of vertex values, and con-
nected vertices tend to have similar values. Here
two extreme groups of comparable sizes and with
opposite opinions are formed leading to a high po-
larization.
Accordingly, a simple way to assign the ‘correlated po-
larization’ values to network states is to define the polar-
ization index to be the product of R and r:
φ = R× r (3)
3Note that the minimum value of φ is not 0 since r could
have a negative value if the connected vertices prefer to
possess opposite opinions, although this is rare in prac-
tice, and for the dynamics we study here, only small neg-
ative values might occur. In this setting, a network state
in which every vertex is assigned +1 and −1 randomly
would have high value of R, but since r would be close
to 0, the value of φ would not be high.
The incorporation of the network structure into the
quantification of polarization has been discussed in [2],
but has not been actually implemented. Our approach
avoids calculation of high modularity partitions [4], and
also improves over the method of using community
boundaries proposed in [12] because we don’t need to
explicitly identify the groups of vertices to calculate the
polarization. This is a great advantage since one can then
quantify the network states when no obvious groups exist
in the first place. We also note that an attempt to explic-
itly incorporate the network structure in the polarization
index has been done in [17]. However, the index in this
case works only when users iteratively update their opin-
ions. Our quantifier on the other hand doesn’t require
any condition like this, and just a snapshot of a network
with the vertex states is sufficient for us to measure the
polarization.
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FIG. 1. A chart showing four types of network states, and
the amounts of polarization (low, moderate or high) that we
would naturally assign them. See the text for a detailed ex-
planation.
III. EFFECT OF ZEALOTRY WITH THE TWO
TYPES OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
Now we discuss the effect of presence of zealots with
the two types of initial conditions. We do this using
the configuration model as a substrate which a random
graph model in which the degree sequence of the network
is fixed, and the network is otherwise random. In a nut-
shell, the configuration model is constructed by randomly
connecting fixed number N of vertices to each other such
that the degree values in the constructed graph come
from a prescribed degree sequence [24]. Hence, one can
study the effect of a particular type of degree distribu-
tion by using the configuration model with degree se-
quence drawn from that distribution. Here we use this
fact to construct a configuration model with Poisson de-
gree distribution (also known as the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph
or the Poisson random graph), and the power-law degree
distribution. The former is a prototype for a degree ho-
mogeneous network since all the degree values are close
to the average, while the later is a prototype for a degree
heterogeneous network since the power-law has a heavy
tail. During the simulation, after generating the required
graph, we extract its largest component, and run the dy-
namics only on it. Thus, the graph sizes in our case may
vary slightly from one realization to another.
A. Erdo˝s-Ren´yi network
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FIG. 2. Variation of the average value of the polarization
〈φ〉 with pz for the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with SICs (top panel)
and RICs (bottom panel) for different values of the average
degree c. The network size in each case is N = 5000, and
averages are obtained using 1000 random realizations. Error
bars show the range containing middle 90% of the data.
Erdo˝s-Ren´yi network or ER network is constructed by
drawing the degree values of N vertices from the Pois-
son distribution with mean c, and then connecting the
half-edges or stubs attached to the vertices uniformly ran-
domly with each other. Hence, c is the average degree for
the constructed graph, and all the degree values are close
to it (A completely equivalent way that is more common
is to connect every pair of vertices with probability c/N
when N is large). The variations of the average value of
the polarization φ with the zealot fraction pz for different
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FIG. 3. A plot showing variations of all three quantifiers
r, R and φ for the ER graph with average degree c = 4 and
c = 10. Results for the SICs are shown in the top panels
whereas those for the RICs are shown in the bottom panels.
Notice that when RICs are used, the curves for r and φ almost
overlap.
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FIG. 4. The average number of flips as a function of the
fraction of zealots for the ER graph of size N ≈ 5000 for SICs
and RICs. It can be seen that the number of flips doesn’t go
to zero for SICs even when every vertex is a zealot, because
the zealotry of vertices is effective only after they acquire a
non-neutral opinion. only for large c majority rule is effective.
See the text for more discussion. Error bars show the range
containing middle 90% of the data.
values of c, are shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen from the
figure, average polarization 〈φ〉 is almost unaffected for
SICs when the network is not too dense, i.e. when c is
small. When c is large, for small values of pz, there is a
modest increase in the polarization, and it saturates for
larger pz values. For RICs, when the network is sparse, φ
steadily decreases as the number of zealots is increased,
but for denser networks it first increases, and then goes
to zero for large values of pz. A deeper insight into these
variations can be drawn by looking at the variations of
R and r separately. In Fig. 3, we show the variations for
c = 4 and c = 10 corresponding to the cases of sparse and
dense networks for SICs and RICs. Interestingly, qualita-
tive behaviour of R seems to depend only on the density
of the network, and not on the type of initial conditions:
for sparse case, increasing the zealot density does not
change R significantly, while for dense case, R increases
as pz increases. On the other hand, the behaviour of r,
depends on both initial conditions and the graph density
leading to four different behaviours in total: (almost)
no change with pz (sparse graph, SICs), initial increase
and saturation (dense graph, SICs), monotonic decrease
(sparse graph, RICs), initial increase and then decrease
(dense graph, RICs). This in turn gives rise to four dif-
ferent behaviours of φ.
The behaviour of R can be explained as follows. For
sparse case, network relatively quickly reaches a balanced
state since the number of neighbours for each vertex is
too small to repeatedly create imbalance around it. Thus,
vertices anyway stabilize promptly even when they are
not zealots, and hence increasing the number of zealots
is redundant in this case. But when the network is dense,
dynamics lasts for a longer time because it becomes pos-
sible to easily create an imbalance around vertices solely
because the number of neighbours is high. When the
number of zealots is small, this imbalance eventually
leads to domination of one particular state. Now, if the
number of zealots is increased, they help balancing the
state faster. But since both types of zealots are present,
the domination of one particular state reduces, and in
this case, R increases with pz. To support this argument,
we count the total number of “flips” till the equilibrium
is reached where a flip is defined as the occurrence of a
change in a node’s state. A given vertex can flip several
times before the steady state of the network is reached,
and hence more the total number of flips, longer the time
taken by the network to stabilize on an average. In Fig. 4,
we show the average number of flips for the ER network
as a function of zealots’ fraction pz for different values of
the average degree c. When pz is small, it can be seen
that the number of flips is much larger for high c than
for low c implying that a dense network leads to greater
imbalance than a sparse one. Also, as pz is increased,
the number of flips decreases rapidly because the zealots
help stabilize the network quickly as argued above.
Now we look at the variations of r. A crucial thing to
note about the assortativity coefficient r is that it is 0
whenever all the vertices have the same state, as well as
when states are assigned uniformly randomly to the ver-
tices. In the former case, it is zero because the expected
number of edges between the same state vertices is the
same as the actual number of edges between them since
there is only one state throughout the network. In the
later case, it is zero because of the random assignments
of states making the expected number of edges between
same state vertices the same as the actual number. With-
out any zealots in the network (pz = 0), for a dense net-
5work, only one opinion dominates as mentioned above,
and hence r is close to zero. Since this is not the case
for a sparse network, because of the majority pressure,
groups of vertices with similar opinions are created and r
acquires large value. Now we must explain what happens
to r as pz is increased for both sparse and dense cases. We
note that the majority pressure tends to make the states
of the connected vertices similar whereas zealots, when
present, successfully oppose this pressure even when it is
very large. For the sparse case, when SICs are used, the
network gets stabilized fast and zealots are redundant as
explained above. This makes r independent of pz similar
to R. For RICs, increasing zealots simply means that the
state assignments become more and more random leading
to gradual decrease in r. When the network is dense, as
the number of zealots is increased, zealots resist the dom-
ination of one opinion and r starts increasing. However,
there comes a point after which effect of random place-
ments of zealots takes over and r again starts decreasing
finally going to 0 when all the vertices are zealots.
B. Configuration model with a power-law degree
distribution
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FIG. 5. Average polarization 〈φ〉 as a function of zealots’
fraction pz for different values of α for the configuration model
with a power-law degree distribution with SICs (top panel)
and RICs (bottom panel). Different curves correspond to dif-
ferent values of the scaling-index α, and the minimum degree
is kmin = 2 in all cases. The network size in each case is
N = 5000, and each average value is obtained using 1000
random realizations. Error bars show the range containing
middle 90% of the data.
The ER network is homogeneous in the sense that its
degree distribution is peaked around the average value.
To check the effect of degree heterogeneity, we use the
configuration model by drawing a degree sequence from
a power-law distribution (p(k) ∼ k−α) with a minimum
degree value kmin. The scaling-index α determines the
skewness of the degree distribution, smaller α implying
higher skewnesss.
The variation of the average value of 〈φ〉 for this case
is shown in Fig. 5. The figure shows an interesting dif-
ference between the cases of homogeneous and hetero-
geneous graphs: for heterogeneous graphs, independent
of the graph density (i.e. independent of the value of
α), zealots always turn out to be ineffective when SICs
are used. However, when RICs are used, the behaviour
of the polarization φ is qualitatively similar to the ho-
mogeneous graph case. However, we see that there is
a quantitative difference between this case and the ER
graph case: for degree heterogeneous graphs, for similar
amounts of edge densities and zealot densities, the cor-
responding polarization values are lower. This happens
because in the degree heterogeneous case hubs influence
many vertices in the network leading to a do dominance
of only one opinion on average, and hence the value of R
is smaller in this case compared with the ER graph.
C. Distributions of polarizations in empirical
networks
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FIG. 6. (Left) Variation of polarization for three physics
collaboration graphs for SICs and RICs. (Right) The degree
distributions of the three graphs depicting their degree het-
erogeneity.
We now turn our attention towards empirical networks.
We specifically study the polarization of three collabora-
tion networks of scientists working in three different dis-
ciplines of physics: condensed matter, astrophysics, and
theoretical high-energy physics taken from [22]. Our re-
sults are summarized in Fig. 6. The results show that
the qualitative behaviour of these networks is similar to
degree heterogeneous networks (see Fig. 5). This is un-
derstandable because the degree distributions of these
networks have heavy-tails as shown in the right panel of
Fig. 6, and hence these networks are degree heteroge-
neous. At the same time, we also see that the variations
are completely monotonic when RICs are used unlike the
case of the power-law configuration model. We think that
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FIG. 7. Distributions of φ with SICs and RICs for different zealot densities pz for the Theoretical High-Energy Physics
collaboration network. The distributions for SICs is seen to be almost unaffected, whereas for SICs it moves towards 0 as pz
is increased. Also, it could be seen that a broad range of φ values is possible when SICs are used but for RICs, only a narrow
range of values is realized.
this is so because of other structures like high clustering,
community structure and non-zero degree-correlations
that are present in these real-world networks but not in
the configuration model.
So far we described our results in terms of average val-
ues only. It is also illuminating to look at the actual
distributions of the polarizations to see how they are af-
fected when zealots’ fraction is varied. The Fig. 7 shows
the distributions of φ for SICs and RICs for the theo-
retical high-energy physics collaboration network. There
are two important things to notice here. First, for SICs,
not only the average value of the polarization, but also
the overall shape of the distribution remains the same as
the number of zealots is increased. Second, the range of
possible φ values is quite large for SICs, but for RICs, the
range is very narrow implying that all initial conditions
lead to almost same polarization in the network.
IV. DEGREE-BASED ZEALOTRY
So far we assumed that the probability that a given
vertex is a zealot is independent of its topological char-
acteristics like its degree, its clustering coefficient or its
position in the network. Thus, an interesting variation
over the uniform assignment of zealotry to the vertices is
to bias it towards the vertices that possess a particular
property. We will call this type of assignment a ‘topo-
logical zealotry’. We note that there have been a few ex-
plorations in the literature in this direction [1, 7, 30, 32].
Here, we consider the case in which only the high degree
vertices are zealots. To achieve this, we select the frac-
tion pz of zealots from the high degree vertices by first
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FIG. 8. Average polarization for the configuration model
as a function of zealots’ fraction pz when high-degree vertices
are made zealots. For SICs, initially the polarization is seen
to change moderately, but over a large range of pz the polar-
ization is constant. For RICs, polarization initially increases
suddenly but then steadily decreases. Error bars show the
range containing middle 90% of the data.
sorting the vertices in descending order of their degrees,
and then making first pzN vertices zealots. Of course,
in general there is no need to restrict ourselves to the
zealotry according to the degree, and one can use any
other topological property like the local clustering or a
centrality.
Fig. 8 shows results of using the degree-based zealotry
7for the configuration model with the power-law degree
distribution. As can be seen there, when SICs are used,
for very small pz, there is a modest increase in 〈φ〉, but
after that point onwards, zealots do not seem to affect
the polarization at all. This is somewhat similar to the
case where zealots are chosen randomly without regard
to degree. For RICs, initial increase in the polarization
is more noticeable, after which it decreases quite linearly
with pz. Though qualitatively these behaviours are sim-
ilar to the random zealotry case, quantitatively we see
that the value of pz at which maximum polarization is
attained is much smaller in the degree based zealotry.
This means that having few high degree vertices in the
heterogeneous network can sharply increase its polariza-
tion, but further increasing the number actually reduces
it. This happens because in case of degree-based zealotry,
both opinions populate approximately equal numbers of
high-degree zealots, and hence a single opinion doesn’t
get to dominate. This means that even with a small
number of zealots, R acquires a large value, after which
decrease in r causes overall decrease in φ. Moreover, this
increase is quite high, especially for more dense networks
(i.e. with lower α), and so the degree based zealotry
seems to be playing critical role in polarizing dense net-
works.
V. CONCLUSION
The study of social polarization is becoming more and
more relevant for a smooth working of our societies in
the digital age. However, a proper quantification of the
social polarization is an open problem. In this work, we
have taken an important step towards quantifying the po-
larization of a social network when the vertex states are
known. Unlike the previous quantifiers which only use
the fractions of vertices in each of the discrete states, our
quantifier also takes into account how the vertices with
different states are connected to each other. Because of
this, for example, when the traditional quantifiers sug-
gest a high value of polarization for a given network, our
quantifier shows that polarization could be much smaller
because of the way the vertices are connected.
The main result of the paper is that the presence
zealots (also known as ‘inflexible minorities’) in a so-
cial network does not have a fixed effect, and can lead
to either positive or negative changes in the polarization
depending on the initial conditions and other factors. In
particular, our results indicate that for sufficiently dense
networks, and with ‘random initial conditions’ (RICs), as
the fraction of zealots pz is increased, polarization first
increases, and then decreases as pz becomes too high.
However, when the network is sparse, the polarization
monotonically decreases with pz. On the other hand,
when ‘seed initial conditions’ (SICs) are used, for dense
networks, polarization first increases with pz and then
saturates unlike the case of RICs. But for sparse net-
works, zealots are almost ineffective with SICs, and po-
larization is independent of pz.
We would also like to note several limitations of the
work presented here. First, the deterministic model of
opinion dynamics used here is too simple to be of much
use in practical contexts, and should only be looked at as
a starting point of the investigations about initial condi-
tion dependence and ‘topological zealotry’ among other
things. Also, we have not taken into account many other
important structural properties of real-world networks in-
cluding clustering, degree-correlations, and community
structure to name a few. In particular, since we use the
configuration model as a substrate, the clustering coeffi-
cient of networks that we have used is close to zero, and
hence the effect of presence of triangles in the network
is necessarily ignored. Our future studies aim to investi-
gate more realistic models of opinion dynamics on static
as well as time-varying networks keeping these important
considerations in mind.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author acknowledges funding from the National
Post Doctoral Fellowship (NPDF) of DST- SERB, India,
File No. PDF/2016/002672.
[1] Amblard, F. & Deffuant, G. (2004) The role of net-
work topology on extremism propagation with the rela-
tive agreement opinion dynamics. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications, 343, 725–738.
[2] Bramson, A., Grim, P., Singer, D. J., Fisher, S.,
Berger, W., Sack, G. & Flocken, C. (2016) Disam-
biguation of social polarization concepts and measures.
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 40(2), 80–111.
[3] Castellano, C., Fortunato, S. & Loreto, V.
(2009) Statistical physics of social dynamics. Rev. Mod-
ern Phys., 81(2), 591.
[4] Conover, M., Ratkiewicz, J., Francisco, M. R.,
Gonc¸alves, B., Menczer, F. & Flammini, A. (2011)
Political polarization on twitter.. Icwsm, 133, 89–96.
[5] Esteban, J.-M. & Ray, D. (1994) On the measurement
of polarization. Econometrica: Journal of the Economet-
ric Society, pp. 819–851.
[6] Finin, T., Murnane, W., Karandikar, A., Keller,
N., Martineau, J. & Dredze, M. (2010) Annotating
named entities in Twitter data with crowdsourcing. in
Proceedings of the NAACL HLT 2010 Workshop on Cre-
ating Speech and Language Data with Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk, pp. 80–88. Association for Computational Lin-
guistics.
[7] Franks, D. W., Noble, J., Kaufmann, P. & Stagl,
S. (2008) Extremism propagation in social networks with
8hubs. Adaptive Behavior, 16(4), 264–274.
[8] Galam, S. & Jacobs, F. (2007) The role of inflexible
minorities in the breaking of democratic opinion dynam-
ics. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
381, 366–376.
[9] Garimella, K., De Francisci Morales, G., Gionis,
A. & Mathioudakis, M. (2017) Factors in recommend-
ing contrarian content on social media. in Proceedings of
the 2017 ACM on Web Science Conference, pp. 263–266.
ACM.
[10] Garimella, K., Morales, G. D. F., Gionis, A. &
Mathioudakis, M. (2018) Quantifying controversy on
social media. ACM Transactions on Social Computing,
1(1), 3.
[11] Garimella, K. & Weber, I. (2017) A long-term
analysis of polarization on Twitter. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1703.02769.
[12] Guerra, P. H. C., Meira Jr, W., Cardie, C. &
Kleinberg, R. (2013) A Measure of Polarization on So-
cial Media Networks Based on Community Boundaries..
in ICWSM.
[13] Guilbeault, D., Becker, J. & Centola, D. (2018)
Social learning and partisan bias in the interpretation of
climate trends. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 115(39), 9714–9719.
[14] Khalil, N., San Miguel, M. & Toral, R. (2018)
Zealots in the mean-field noisy voter model. Phys. Rev.
E, 97(1), 012310.
[15] Klamser, P. P., Wiedermann, M., Donges, J. F. &
Donner, R. V. (2017) Zealotry effects on opinion dy-
namics in the adaptive voter model. Phys. Rev. E, 96(5),
052315.
[16] Lee, J. K., Choi, J., Kim, C. & Kim, Y. (2014) Social
media, network heterogeneity, and opinion polarization.
Journal of communication, 64(4), 702–722.
[17] Matakos, A., Terzi, E. & Tsaparas, P. (2017) Mea-
suring and moderating opinion polarization in social net-
works. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, 31(5),
1480–1505.
[18] Menon, A. (2012) Big data@ facebook. in Proceedings of
the 2012 workshop on Management of big data systems,
pp. 31–32. ACM.
[19] Mobilia, M. (2003) Does a single zealot affect an infinite
group of voters?. Phys. Rev. Lett., 91(2), 028701.
[20] Mobilia, M. & Georgiev, I. T. (2005) Voting and
catalytic processes with inhomogeneities. Phys. Rev. E,
71(4), 046102.
[21] Morales, A., Borondo, J., Losada, J. C. & Benito,
R. M. (2015) Measuring political polarization: Twitter
shows the two sides of Venezuela. Chaos: An Interdisci-
plinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 25(3), 033114.
[22] Newman, M. E. (2001) The structure of scientific col-
laboration networks. Proceedings of the national academy
of sciences, 98(2), 404–409.
[23] Newman, M. E. J. (2002) Assortative mixing in net-
works. Phys. Rev. Lett., 89(20), 208701.
[24] Newman, M. E. J. (2018) Networks. Oxford university
press.
[25] Shekatkar, S. M. & Barve, S. (2018) Importance of
initial conditions in the polarization of complex networks.
Europhys. Lett., 122(3), 38002.
[26] Spohr, D. (2017) Fake news and ideological polarization:
Filter bubbles and selective exposure on social media.
Business Information Review, 34(3), 150–160.
[27] Sunstein, C. R. (2018) #Republic: Divided democracy
in the age of social media. Princeton University Press.
[28] Waagen, A., Verma, G., Chan, K., Swami, A.
& D’Souza, R. (2015) Effect of zealotry in high-
dimensional opinion dynamics models. Phys. Rev. E,
91(2), 022811.
[29] Webster, J. G. (2010) User information regimes: How
social media shape patterns of consumption. Nw. UL
Rev., 104, 593.
[30] Wu, F. & Huberman, B. A. (2004) Social structure and
opinion formation. arXiv preprint cond-mat/0407252.
[31] Xie, J., Sreenivasan, S., Korniss, G., Zhang, W.,
Lim, C. & Szymanski, B. K. (2011) Social consensus
through the influence of committed minorities. Physical
Review E, 84(1), 011130.
[32] Yildiz, E., Ozdaglar, A., Acemoglu, D., Saberi, A.
& Scaglione, A. (2013) Binary opinion dynamics with
stubborn agents. ACM Transactions on Economics and
Computation (TEAC), 1(4), 19.
[33] Zachary, W. W. (1977) An information flow model for
conflict and fission in small groups. Journal of anthropo-
logical research, 33(4), 452–473.
